



## The Land Revenue System Of The United Provinces (U.P.) Of Agra And Awadh

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*Abstract: The amount of government in the wealth that India provided was found to be suitable for the construction of something fundamentally fixed to a significant level. As the scriptures were formally deciphered, the full apparatus of an astonishing developed organisation was created and maintained at a tremendous cost, rising above the urgent necessity of India itself. This equipment included pricey items like the cost of giving up the Company's freedoms to the Crown, the price of concurrent conflicts in China and Abyssinia, the price of every government-related expense in London that had even a passing connection to India, right down to the charwoman's salary in the India office, and the price of boats that cruised but did not take part in hostilities.*

These and other types of cash were taken out of the Indian Treasury prior to the year 1870. That official strategy and practise with regard to India's horticultural industry should have been dominated throughout by a concern for the land income is justified; it made up by far the majority of government pay and, with farming's extension having advanced so fervently in the last half of the nineteenth century, it couldn't increase. The horticulture-based region of UPA and Awadh does not stand out as an exception in the situation. Without a doubt, the definition of the land income strategy had a significant negative impact on the provincial government's interests if land income had been the main source of funding for the government of the province. This had a direct financial and social impact on the majority of the territories' population. Because of this, it's crucial to pay close attention to how land revenue affects rural UPA and Awadh's financial situation.

Key words: United Provinces, Awadh, horticulture, government.

**OFFICIAL MIND AND IDEOLOGY-** Climate, monetary turn of events, or the ambition for power- whichever came first- framed the requirement of the authority mentality in its upper ranges. This

was a speculative concern that stepped out from the immediate monetary demands of the Raj, which are unarguable facts.<sup>1</sup> During the time of Bentinck, the North Western regions were immediately set apart out as handling the most forceful modernising of Indian commonplace organisation. However, R.M. Bard, one of the organization's developmental personalities, has no deceptions as to where the needs lie. As would have been natural for him, the British Government from its behavioral and emotional position had been, was, and should be an expensive government to India. "The government is responsible for bringing in as much revenue as the country's resources can sustain without jeopardising public safety." It is sufficient to stress the importance of maintaining a substantial army both for the purpose of exterior defence and to dissuade those who are dissatisfied with the government or to punish attempts at internal treason and unrest. However, in order for Britain to achieve the very wonderful results I believe she is destined to achieve for India, she must continue to exert pressure on India's resources for a very long period.<sup>2</sup>

In light of the stress caused by the anticipation of a beneficial exchange from European trade interests, there is no reason to doubt that it would be possible to ease the burden of tax collection on the land through the implementation of a system that imposes a high income duty on all business conducted within and without the country. Amusingly, the British were forced

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to outperform more traditional Indian governments in terms of their dependency on land revenue<sup>5</sup>.

In the NWP, the old-style theory was presented in a confusing way. A mediator class was chosen at the commencement of British rule to collect land revenues. A lease scholar like Holt Mackenzie, whose support for the action was based on his belief that the confidential lease property that was created by the limit of the public authority's request should not be wasted among a large number of poor growers.<sup>6</sup> With regard to establishing a rental framework, one might state that in 1855, when a more seasoned organisation periodical settlement was projected to end in 1867, a new norm was established that would serve as the basis for future reviews. To arrive at value rates, officials needed to look at all of the mahal rentals that went towards building a pargana. The rental records for each mahal were compared and a "rent rate" was produced, which was subsequently adjusted if the resources recorded for most mahals were found to be overabundant. The interest rate was based on the revised rate.<sup>6</sup> Every provincial branch of the royal organisation used the Saharanpur guideline in its review process. All of the revenue evaluation changes in the UPA and Awadh were made on the basis of leasing. Lt. Legislative head of NWP William Muir stated in 1863 that the "jamabandi (or lease roll) on which the appraisal was to be based was to be outlined as per actual circumstances."<sup>6</sup>

The East India Company's

enlargement of Awadh on February 13, 1856 established another portion during the entirety of property manager labourer relations. This segment lasted all through the entire existence of building manager labourer relations. Over the course of a span of three years, two distinct standards were approved in reference to the manner in which the territory handles its land income. The primary settlement that was established after the expansion was somewhat supportive of the town owners, in contrast to the other community that was established after the revolution in 1858, which not only repaired the work that was crafted by the earlier settlement but also destroyed the labourer. The Taluqdari Settlement, which went into effect on May 1 of that year 1858, was the final scenario that emerged. The vast majority of the taluqdars who had persisted through the first settlement were given their positions back. Significant L. Cart, one of the Special Commissioners of Revenue in Awadh, "threw about domains as vast as shires and entire realms with the rush of his hand," in the same way that Napoleon used to take off domains or move thump balls around in the past. As may be seen in the table that follows, the most extensive hold of land income settlement was given to taluqdars following the conclusion of the most recent settlement that took place.

**IMPACTS OF THE LAND SYSTEM ON THE LAND HOLDING STRUCTURE-** Considering the UPA and Awadh as a whole, the design of the landownership system can be

depicted as a pyramid with a broad base that soon tapers to a narrow, tall, and restricted tip top pinnacle. Although there was a significant amount of layered change, the width of first class discussion remained relatively unchanged with only a few changes across the region. This is because the number of income payers making more than Rs. 250 out of a single district rarely exceeded 1,000.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, the British land policy did bring about a few noteworthy adjustments during the course of the nineteenth century. It is estimated that the population remained remarkably stable up until the year 1921, growing by somewhere around 10 percent. Subsequently, the number of landowners also remained remarkably consistent, with the registration announcing that there were 1,196,876 of them in 1881 and 1,275,432 of them in 1931. Assuming that all other factors remain the same, there appears to be areas of strength for an argument in favour of accepting that the proliferation of constrictive best interest was advancing rapidly from the end of the nineteenth century onward, and that the area of proprietorship advantages continued to rise.<sup>8</sup> For example, in Bijnor, settlement administrators wrote in 1939 about the "immense increase in the quantity of mahals because of parcel it had trebled beginning around 18729; thinking about the figure, the increment was eightfold in the Muzaffarnagar region between 1860 and 1921. Since the previous settlement in 1870, the number of co-shares that were held



in the Bareilly region had increased by a factor of four. In Merrut, the number was greater than two and fell midway between the years 1868 and 194010.

This break in continuity was mostly the result of land movement; nevertheless, this movement was far slower than the expansion of exclusive privileges, which suggests that a new land class emerged during this brief period of time. It would appear that there is strong evidence to support the hypothesis that the wealthy elite who owned vast tracts of land were shielded from the general stream of development and movement, primarily due to financial considerations and to a lesser extent on account of institutional procedures.<sup>11</sup> In the years immediately following the insurrection, factors such as the rise in costs beginning in the late 1860s, the transition to cash lease, and the expansion of money crop appeared to make the British institutional intentions for reducing Indian resident to a landowner residency basis a possibility. Even as late as 1867, people in the Saharanpur region had the opinion that there did not appear to be any substantial difference between the rent-paying occupant and the rent-paying landlord.<sup>12</sup> By the year 1890, the L.A. Doorman indicated that the traditional equity between a property manager and a resident had given way to competition. This was in contrast to the few residences that were controlled by developing networks at the time, where a certain amount of land was rented out at

income rates.<sup>13</sup> In Badaun, the activity can be more easily recognised due to its more obvious location. Between the years 1850 and 1870, there was no difference between inhabitation and yearly occupants according to the gauges; both continued to pay a normal 20 percent of the produce esteem in spite of the rising costs. By the year 1900, however, inhabitation rents addressed only 13 percent of the generate sense of worth while yearly inhabitants actually paid 20 percent. After the turn of the century, there was a significant shift in the circumstances.<sup>14</sup> The current state of affairs was achieved by the inheritance of a number of smaller mahals in addition to larger bequests from the more established landholding family. At the turn of the century, the people who lived in the Kuchchesar domain, which is located in the southern part of Meerut, had essentially won their freedom. The occupant of the inhabitation feels that his only concern with his property management was to give him a payment request for his lease, and he refers to his inhabitation land on a regular basis as hamari (ours).<sup>15</sup>

**TABLE-I**  
**PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LAND HELD**

	Wages (Rupees)	Brahmins	Vaisy Landing Caste	Shudra	Untouchables
1802	30	11.2	1.5	12.6	74.7
1880	364	168	3.7	15.7	61
1875-74	316	266	6.3	12.4	68
1890-98	383	31.2	5.2	6.8	45

In addition, the same could be stated about any other region. In Aligarh, the Vaishya community increased its hold on the land from 3.4 percent in

1839 to 12.3 percent in 1868, while the Brahmin structure dropped from 9 percent in 1839 to 9.2 percent in 1868. On the other hand, the Thakur community saw its share of the land decrease from 38 percent in 1838 to 28 percent in 1868, and then further to 23.3 percent in 1903.<sup>16</sup> Vaishya's gains were gradual in Meerut, which was one of the most popularised regions; the region's Vaishya population was 7 percent in 1968, and it had increased only to 7.8 percent since 1900.<sup>17</sup> One of the effects that the British occupancy laws had was to support the qualification's potential for being misleading. While a certain category of income payers was singled out and considered landowners due to land income reasons, this group of income payers generally remained owners of a lease charge or the viable proprietor, the protected resident to whom the majority of rural benefits progressively passed due to lease control and social powers. The question of whether a certain person is a zamindar, a good rate dweller, or an inhabitation occupant is the only one that was left open for reasonable significance and contentious premium. The question that really matters is whether or not he holds his property at positive or negative rates and whether or not he has sufficient amounts of it.<sup>18</sup>

**SOCIO ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE BRITISH LAND POLICY-** It is extremely evident that the equivalent has a direct influence on the financial basis of the province NWP and Awadh governments given the existing state of affairs, in which it is said that the



land revenue plan of the British organisation holds a focus topic of organisation. Therefore, the influence on the general populace of the arrangements established and carried out by the Colonial Government is something that should always be kept in mind and adhered to as a general rule. Perhaps the event known as Awadh might be considered the first occurrence of its kind to take place during the closing decades of the nineteenth century. The Taluqdari Settlement was established by the British government, and it designated taluqdar as the legal owner of the land. As for inhabitation privileges, Wingfield<sup>19</sup>, the central engineer of the contemporary taluqdari in Awadh, argued that a property manager needed to have complete discretion over the arrangement of his tenants.<sup>20</sup> The Governor General agreed with Wingfield's recommendations and supported them.<sup>21</sup> Later on, Sir John Strachey, who became Chief Commissioner in March 1866, gave some assistance, and taluqdars promised to give sub settling right to under owners on the condition that there would be no right of inhabitation in Awadh. This was a prerequisite for the agreement.<sup>22</sup> In the end, the Awadh Rent movement of 1868 did not recognise any other form of inhabitation right other than the notion that residents who had had constrained freedoms for at least 30 years of extension should be granted inhabitation rights.<sup>23</sup>

**CONCLUSION-** Because of the high level of suffering endured by the employees, the Awadh leasing

statute of 1868 was subject to a number of proposed amendments. In any case, by that point in 1887, innumerable ejection notices had already been distributed across the entirety of Awadh. In the years 1885-186, not long before the new Rent Act was put to rest, the figures made touch with the sky level. During that year, there were around 92,451 ejection notices issued over the entirety of Awadh.<sup>24</sup> The new Act went into effect on the first of January in 1887, and there was a brief period during which the proletariat enjoyed an uptick in assistance. Once more, however, beginning in the year 1889, the total number of people ejected from their homes increased. In 1889, it stood at 4,233, in 1890 it rose to 6,199, and in 1891 it reached 8,422. The tenants, for the most part, gave their assent to the demands made by the property managers because they had almost no recourse to legal action in the courts and because refusing to comply would have left them in a state of abject poverty. Abuse and shady dealings are inherent to the concept of feudalism, and the fate of the lower classes in Awadh was not meant to be any different than in other places where feudalism existed under the cover of frontier security. Both colonialism and feudalism were dependent on one another for their existence and worked together in an ideal cooperative effort in Awadh. The Peasantry wanted to overlay the mistreatment of colonialism and feudalism. The British land strategy in Awadh had a direct and immediate impact on the collaborative effort that was

undertaken. In this way, if the Awadh strategy failed, it would not have been due to the conclusiveness of the Governors or the ruse of the public legislators; rather, it would have been due to the fact that it attempted to treat as a social unrest of gigantic extents what was more akin to the pretty standard repeated theme of an amazingly modern and profoundly adoptable society. In other words, the Awadh strategy tried to treat what was happening as a social unrest.

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